Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

by: Roger B Myerson

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 5, No. 1. (January 1993), pp. 118-132.

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Abstract

A theoretical model is developed for predicting the relative effectiveness of different electoral systems for reducing government corruption. We consider voting games in which parties with known corruption levels and known positions on a major policy question compete for legislative seats. We find that approval voting and proportional representation are fully effective, in the sense that all equilibria exclude corrupt parties from legislative seats. Plurality voting is partly effective, in the sense that there always exist some equilibria that exclude corrupt parties. Borda voting is ineffective because, for some political situations, no equilibria can guarantee the exclusion of corrupt parties. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number D72.

@article{citeulike:2909224, abstract = {A theoretical model is developed for predicting the relative effectiveness of different electoral systems for reducing government corruption. We consider voting games in which parties with known corruption levels and known positions on a major policy question compete for legislative seats. We find that approval voting and proportional representation are fully effective, in the sense that all equilibria exclude corrupt parties from legislative seats. Plurality voting is partly effective, in the sense that there always exist some equilibria that exclude corrupt parties. Borda voting is ineffective because, for some political situations, no equilibria can guarantee the exclusion of corrupt parties. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number D72.}, author = {Myerson, Roger B. }, citeulike-article-id = {2909224}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1006}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, keywords = {administration, corruption}, month = {January}, number = {1}, pages = {118--132}, posted-at = {2008-06-25 09:38:06}, priority = {2}, title = {Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1006}, volume = {5}, year = {1993} }

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TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2909224 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2909224 TI - Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis JF - Games and Economic Behavior VL - 5 IS - 1 SP - 118 EP - 132 N2 - A theoretical model is developed for predicting the relative effectiveness of different electoral systems for reducing government corruption. We consider voting games in which parties with known corruption levels and known positions on a major policy question compete for legislative seats. We find that approval voting and proportional representation are fully effective, in the sense that all equilibria exclude corrupt parties from legislative seats. Plurality voting is partly effective, in the sense that there always exist some equilibria that exclude corrupt parties. Borda voting is ineffective because, for some political situations, no equilibria can guarantee the exclusion of corrupt parties. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number D72. KW - administration KW - corruption AU - Myerson, Roger PY - 1993/01// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1006 ER -

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