Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes

by: Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini

The American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 1. (2004), pp. 25-45.

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Abstract

We investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on fiscal policy outcomes in a large sample of democracies. We rely on different estimation methods to address prospective problems of statistical inference, due to nonrandom selection of these constitutional rules. The findings are consistent with our theoretical priors: presidential regimes induce smaller governments than parliamentary democracies, while majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs than proportional elections.

@article{citeulike:2947785, abstract = {We investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on fiscal policy outcomes in a large sample of democracies. We rely on different estimation methods to address prospective problems of statistical inference, due to nonrandom selection of these constitutional rules. The findings are consistent with our theoretical priors: presidential regimes induce smaller governments than parliamentary democracies, while majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs than proportional elections.}, author = {Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido }, citeulike-article-id = {2947785}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3592767}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, keywords = {constitution, fiscal\_policy, policy, political\_economy}, number = {1}, pages = {25--45}, posted-at = {2008-07-01 13:03:42}, priority = {4}, publisher = {American Economic Association}, title = {Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3592767}, volume = {94}, year = {2004} }

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TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2947785 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2947785 TI - Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes JF - The American Economic Review VL - 94 IS - 1 SP - 25 EP - 45 PB - American Economic Association N2 - We investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on fiscal policy outcomes in a large sample of democracies. We rely on different estimation methods to address prospective problems of statistical inference, due to nonrandom selection of these constitutional rules. The findings are consistent with our theoretical priors: presidential regimes induce smaller governments than parliamentary democracies, while majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs than proportional elections. KW - constitution KW - fiscal_policy KW - policy KW - political_economy AU - Persson, Torsten AU - Tabellini, Guido PY - 2004/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3592767 ER -

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