Comparative Politics and Public Finance

@article{citeulike:1404870, abstract = {We propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes. Compared to a parliamentary regime, the institutions of a presidential-congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers. These differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending. A parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority, less underprovision of public goods, and more rents to politicians; a presidential-congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities, more underprovision of public goods, but less rents to politicians. The size of government is smaller under a presidential regime. This last prediction is consistent with cross-country data.}, author = {Persson, Torsten and Roland, G\'{e}rard and Tabellini, Guido }, citeulike-article-id = {1404870}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3078495}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, keywords = {election, fiscal\_policy, policy, political\_economy}, number = {6}, pages = {1121--1161}, posted-at = {2008-07-01 13:05:03}, priority = {3}, title = {Comparative Politics and Public Finance}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3078495}, volume = {108}, year = {2000} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1404870 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1404870 TI - Comparative Politics and Public Finance JF - The Journal of Political Economy VL - 108 IS - 6 SP - 1121 EP - 1161 N2 - We propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes. Compared to a parliamentary regime, the institutions of a presidential-congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers. These differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending. A parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority, less underprovision of public goods, and more rents to politicians; a presidential-congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities, more underprovision of public goods, but less rents to politicians. The size of government is smaller under a presidential regime. This last prediction is consistent with cross-country data. KW - election KW - fiscal_policy KW - policy KW - political_economy AU - Persson, Torsten AU - Roland, Gérard AU - Tabellini, Guido PY - 2000/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3078495 ER -