How Do We Tell an Association From a Rule? Comment on Sloman (1996)

by: Gerd Gigerenzer, Terry Regier

Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 119, No. 1. (January 1996), pp. 23-26.

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Abstract

S. A. Sloman's (1996) intriguing argument for separate associative and rule-based reasoning systems is unfortunately damaged by a certain amount of slack in the distinction he makes between these two posited mental mechanisms. The authors suggest that the distinction could be sharpened by overt reference to explicit models of associative and rule-based processing. They also point out that "simultaneous contradictory belief, " which Sloman takes as evidence for separate associative and rule-based systems, need not be interpreted in this fashion. It may also signal a number of other things, including the presence of linguistic ambiguity (as in the Linda problem), competing lines of formal reasoning (as in the Wason selection task), and unclarified assumptions (as in the 3 doors problem).

@article{citeulike:165314, abstract = {S. A. Sloman's (1996) intriguing argument for separate associative and rule-based reasoning systems is unfortunately damaged by a certain amount of slack in the distinction he makes between these two posited mental mechanisms. The authors suggest that the distinction could be sharpened by overt reference to explicit models of associative and rule-based processing. They also point out that "simultaneous contradictory belief, " which Sloman takes as evidence for separate associative and rule-based systems, need not be interpreted in this fashion. It may also signal a number of other things, including the presence of linguistic ambiguity (as in the Linda problem), competing lines of formal reasoning (as in the Wason selection task), and unclarified assumptions (as in the 3 doors problem).}, author = {Gigerenzer, Gerd and Regier, Terry }, citeulike-article-id = {165314}, journal = {Psychological Bulletin}, keywords = {dualmechanisms}, month = {January}, number = {1}, pages = {23--26}, posted-at = {2005-04-20 12:53:33}, priority = {2}, title = {How Do We Tell an Association From a Rule? Comment on Sloman (1996)}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WY5-46RKGJ6-2/2/701c31b332e8a7c101aa9124cab895a8}, volume = {119}, year = {1996} }

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TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:165314 L3 - citeulike-article-id:165314 TI - How Do We Tell an Association From a Rule? Comment on Sloman (1996) JF - Psychological Bulletin VL - 119 IS - 1 SP - 23 EP - 26 N2 - S. A. Sloman's (1996) intriguing argument for separate associative and rule-based reasoning systems is unfortunately damaged by a certain amount of slack in the distinction he makes between these two posited mental mechanisms. The authors suggest that the distinction could be sharpened by overt reference to explicit models of associative and rule-based processing. They also point out that "simultaneous contradictory belief, " which Sloman takes as evidence for separate associative and rule-based systems, need not be interpreted in this fashion. It may also signal a number of other things, including the presence of linguistic ambiguity (as in the Linda problem), competing lines of formal reasoning (as in the Wason selection task), and unclarified assumptions (as in the 3 doors problem). KW - dualmechanisms AU - Gigerenzer, Gerd AU - Regier, Terry PY - 1996/01// UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WY5-46RKGJ6-2/2/701c31b332e8a7c101aa9124cab895a8 ER -

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