Propositional Reasoning by Mental Models? Simple to Refute in Principle and in Practice

by: David P O'Brien, Martin D Braine, Yingrui Yang

Psychological Review, Vol. 101, No. 4. (October 1994), pp. 711-724.

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Abstract

Two experiments compared the predictions of mental-models theory with a mental-logic theory. Results show that people do not make fallacious inferences predicted by mental-models theory but not predicted by mental-logic theory and that people routinely make many valid inferences predicted by mental-logic theory that should be too difficult on mental-models theory. Thus, the mental-logic theory accounts better for the data. A difference between the two theories concerning predictions about the order in which inferences are made was also investigated. The data clearly favor the mental-logic theory. It is argued that the mental-logic theory provides the more plausible description of the actual psychological processes in propositional reasoning.

@article{citeulike:162650, abstract = {Two experiments compared the predictions of mental-models theory with a mental-logic theory. Results show that people do not make fallacious inferences predicted by mental-models theory but not predicted by mental-logic theory and that people routinely make many valid inferences predicted by mental-logic theory that should be too difficult on mental-models theory. Thus, the mental-logic theory accounts better for the data. A difference between the two theories concerning predictions about the order in which inferences are made was also investigated. The data clearly favor the mental-logic theory. It is argued that the mental-logic theory provides the more plausible description of the actual psychological processes in propositional reasoning.}, author = {O'Brien, David P. and Braine, Martin D. and Yang, Yingrui }, citeulike-article-id = {162650}, journal = {Psychological Review}, keywords = {mentallogic}, month = {October}, number = {4}, pages = {711--724}, posted-at = {2005-04-16 19:03:38}, priority = {5}, title = {Propositional Reasoning by Mental Models? Simple to Refute in Principle and in Practice}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6X04-46SGMS9-B/2/ec452de61fc2157d719a5b64af3403e1}, volume = {101}, year = {1994} }

RIS record

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:162650 L3 - citeulike-article-id:162650 TI - Propositional Reasoning by Mental Models? Simple to Refute in Principle and in Practice JF - Psychological Review VL - 101 IS - 4 SP - 711 EP - 724 N2 - Two experiments compared the predictions of mental-models theory with a mental-logic theory. Results show that people do not make fallacious inferences predicted by mental-models theory but not predicted by mental-logic theory and that people routinely make many valid inferences predicted by mental-logic theory that should be too difficult on mental-models theory. Thus, the mental-logic theory accounts better for the data. A difference between the two theories concerning predictions about the order in which inferences are made was also investigated. The data clearly favor the mental-logic theory. It is argued that the mental-logic theory provides the more plausible description of the actual psychological processes in propositional reasoning. KW - mentallogic AU - O'Brien, David AU - Braine, Martin AU - Yang, Yingrui PY - 1994/10// UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6X04-46SGMS9-B/2/ec452de61fc2157d719a5b64af3403e1 ER -

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