<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<rdf:RDF
   xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
   xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#"
   xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/"
   xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
   xmlns:prism="http://prismstandard.org/namespaces/1.2/basic/"
   xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"

>
<channel rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/about">
<pubDate>Thu, 21 Aug 2008 15:29:14 BST</pubDate>


	<title>CiteULike: plm supplementary</title>
	<description>CiteULike: plm supplementary</description>


	<link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/plm/tag/supplementary</link>
	<dc:publisher>CiteULike.org</dc:publisher>
	<dc:language>en-gb</dc:language>
	<dc:rights>Copyright &#169; 2004-2008 citeulike.org</dc:rights>
	<items>
    <rdf:Seq>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/user/plm/article/2730075"/>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/user/plm/article/2730062"/>

	</rdf:Seq>
	</items>
	</channel>


<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/plm/article/2730075">
    <title>Supplemental health insurance ownership in Israel: An empirical analysis and some implications</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/plm/article/2730075</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Social Science &#38; Medicine, Vol. 46, No. 7. (1 April 1998), pp. 821-829.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Many Western nations are implementing (or considering) changes in their health care systems. An integral component of these changes (or debates) refers to the functioning and regulation of the supplementary health insurance market. However, only limited empirical evidence exists on the functioning of the market, which is prone to the problems of moral hazard, adverse selection and risk selection. This paper presents an empirical analysis of ownership patterns of four supplementary insurance policies (acute care, nursing care, dental care and emergency intensive care) in the Israeli population aged 45-75 in 1993. It further discusses some social policy and regulation issues related to the supplemental health insurance market in the post-1995 era of the Israeli National Health Insurance.</description>
    <dc:title>Supplemental health insurance ownership in Israel: An empirical analysis and some implications</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Amir Shmueli</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/S0277-9536(97)00202-5</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Social Science &#38; Medicine, Vol. 46, No. 7. (1 April 1998), pp. 821-829.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-04-28T14:04:55-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1998</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Social Science &#38; Medicine</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>46</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>7</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>821</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>829</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>insurance</prism:category>
    <prism:category>supplementary</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/plm/article/2730062">
    <title>Supplementary health insurance as a tool for risk-selection in mandatory basic health insurance markets</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/plm/article/2730062</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Health Economics, Policy and Law, Vol. 2, No. 02. (2007), pp. 173-192.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As the share of supplementary health insurance (SI) in health care finance is likely to grow, SI may become an increasingly attractive tool for risk-selection in basic health insurance (BI). In this paper, we develop a conceptual framework to assess the probability that insurers will use SI for favourable risk-selection in BI. We apply our framework to five countries in which risk-selection via SI is feasible: Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. For each country, we review the available evidence of SI being used as selection device. We find that the probability that SI is and will be used for risk-selection substantially varies across countries. Finally, we discuss several strategies for policy makers to reduce the chance that SI will be used for risk-selection in BI markets.</description>
    <dc:title>Supplementary health insurance as a tool for risk-selection in mandatory basic health insurance markets</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Francesco Paolucci</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>ERIK Schut</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Konstantin Beck</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Stefan Gre?</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Van</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>IRIT Zmora</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>Health Economics, Policy and Law, Vol. 2, No. 02. (2007), pp. 173-192.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-04-28T13:58:55-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2007</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Health Economics, Policy and Law</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>2</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>02</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>173</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>192</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>health</prism:category>
    <prism:category>insurance</prism:category>
    <prism:category>mandatory</prism:category>
    <prism:category>risk-selection</prism:category>
    <prism:category>supplementary</prism:category>
</item>



</rdf:RDF>

