Sun, 20 Jul 2008 21:42:22 BST CiteULike: oamg cooperation http://www.citeulike.org/user/oamg/tag/cooperation CiteULike.org en-gb Copyright © 2004-2008 citeulike.org http://www.citeulike.org/user/oamg/article/1916523 <i>Nature, Vol. 450, No. 7168. (15 November 2007), pp. 411-414.</i> Cooperation and conflict in quorum-sensing bacterial populations Stephen Diggle Ashleigh Griffin Genevieve Campbell Stuart West doi:10.1038/nature06279 Nature, Vol. 450, No. 7168. (15 November 2007), pp. 411-414. 2007-11-14T23:13:54-00:00 2007 Nature 450 7168 411 414 Nature Publishing Group bacteria cooperation exploitation masses of quorum sensing the tragedy http://www.citeulike.org/user/oamg/article/1372919 <i>Brain Res Cogn Brain Res, Vol. 23, No. 1. (April 2005), pp. 24-33.</i><br /><br />In this paper, we examine decisions to cooperate in economic games. We investigate which payoffs give players the greatest pleasure and whether the pleasure they feel about payoffs predicts their decisions to cooperate. To do this, we modify the ultimatum and dictator games by asking players to consider a fixed set of offers and report their preferences over all offers. Players also report the pleasure they imagine feeling from each possible payoff. Results show that players differ in the extent to which they derive pleasure from fairness or greediness. They also differ in the extent to which their choices depend on what we call "strategic" and "non-strategic" pleasure. Strategic pleasure is the expected pleasure of offers, whereas non-strategic pleasure is the pleasure of accepted payoffs. Players whose pleasure primarily depends on larger payoffs tend to make fair offers in the ultimatum game and selfish offers in the dictator game. They maximize strategic pleasure in the ultimatum game and non-strategic pleasure in the dictator game. Players who derive greater pleasure from fairness tend to act fairly in both games. These players maximize non-strategic pleasure. Brain imaging studies should address the question of whether the observed differences in pleasure and preference are systematically linked to differences in neurological activation. Emotions and cooperation in economic games. MP Haselhuhn BA Mellers doi:10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2005.01.005 Brain Res Cogn Brain Res, Vol. 23, No. 1. (April 2005), pp. 24-33. 2007-06-08T14:47:26-00:00 2005 Brain Res Cogn Brain Res 0926-6410 23 1 24 33 altruism altruism_strategic cooperation emotions game_theory http://www.citeulike.org/user/oamg/article/1222845 <i>Philosophical Studies, Vol. 123, No. 3. (April 2005), pp. 213-230.</i><br /><br />Genuine altruism would appear to be incompatible with evolutionary theory. And yet altruistic behavior would seem to occur, at least on occasion. This article first considers a game-theoretical attempt at solving this seeming paradox, before considering a “group selectionist” approach. Neither approach, as they stand, would seem to render genuine, as opposed to reciprocal, altruism compatible with the theory of evolution. The article concludes by offering an alternative game-theoretical solution to the problem of altruism. Evolution and the problem of altruism Alan Carter doi:10.1007/s11098-005-1289-6 Philosophical Studies, Vol. 123, No. 3. (April 2005), pp. 213-230. 2007-04-12T20:15:28-00:00 2005 Philosophical Studies 123 3 213 230 altruism cooperation evolution