On preferences and doing the right thing: Satisfaction with advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is limited

@article{citeulike:232194, abstract = {We examine outcome satisfaction in situations in which people receive better outcomes than comparable other persons. Building on classical and modern social psychological theories, we argue that when reacting to these arrangements of advantageous inequity, judging the advantage is quick and easy as preferences are primary. We further propose that adjusting this appraisal requires cognitive resources as it entails integrating fairness concerns with the initial preference appraisal. Extending the literature on cognitive busyness, we therefore predict that people should be more satisfied with advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is strongly--as opposed to weakly--limited. Findings across several different experimental paradigms support our predictions. Taken together, our findings shed light on the psychological processes underlying the intriguing interplay between egoism- and fairness-based considerations when evaluating outcomes, as well as on more general preference and adjustment processes.}, author = {van den Bos, Kees and Peters, Susanne L. and Bobocel, Ramona R. and Ybema, Jan F. }, citeulike-article-id = {232194}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2005.04.003}, journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology}, keywords = {cognitive-load, equity, fairness, inequity, outcome}, posted-at = {2005-06-20 10:47:07}, priority = {3}, title = {On preferences and doing the right thing: Satisfaction with advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is limited}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2005.04.003}, volume = {In Press, Corrected Proof} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:232194 L3 - citeulike-article-id:232194 TI - On preferences and doing the right thing: Satisfaction with advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is limited JF - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology VL - In Press, Corrected Proof N2 - We examine outcome satisfaction in situations in which people receive better outcomes than comparable other persons. Building on classical and modern social psychological theories, we argue that when reacting to these arrangements of advantageous inequity, judging the advantage is quick and easy as preferences are primary. We further propose that adjusting this appraisal requires cognitive resources as it entails integrating fairness concerns with the initial preference appraisal. Extending the literature on cognitive busyness, we therefore predict that people should be more satisfied with advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is strongly--as opposed to weakly--limited. Findings across several different experimental paradigms support our predictions. Taken together, our findings shed light on the psychological processes underlying the intriguing interplay between egoism- and fairness-based considerations when evaluating outcomes, as well as on more general preference and adjustment processes. KW - cognitive-load KW - equity KW - fairness KW - inequity KW - outcome AU - van den Bos, Kees AU - Peters, Susanne AU - Bobocel, Ramona AU - Ybema, Jan UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2005.04.003 ER -